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THE MEANING AND NATURE OF PROPERTY: HOMEOWNERSHIP 
AND SHARED EQUITY IN THE CONTEXT OF POVERTY 
MICHAEL DIAMOND* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Property is that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and 
exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of 
any other individual in the universe.1 
Blackstone’s famous statement, derived from Lockean principals, has 
come to exemplify the currently popular, largely unquestioned, view of 
property in American society.  The statement, however, is an inaccurate 
description of what property is in today’s American society.  It also leaves 
unexamined how highly contested the definition of property has been 
throughout our history.  Yet the term property or the term ownership has 
concerned legal theorists and political philosophers, although not the general 
public, for centuries.  I began to think systematically about the meaning of 
these terms after a student had written a paper for me that challenged the 
concept of ownership as applied to shared equity homeownership.2 
For some time now, the concept of shared equity ownership has been a 
major component of programs offering publicly subsidized homeownership to 
low income Americans.3  The student’s claim, however, was that the limitation 
 
* Professor of Law and Director of the Harrison Institute for Housing and Community 
Development, Georgetown Law.  An earlier version of this paper was presented at Georgetown 
Law in a workshop on the Public Nature of Private Property.  I want to thank my friend and 
colleague, Peter Byrne for his always helpful comments, the participants at the Georgetown 
workshop and Daniel Park, my research assistant, for his excellent and imaginative work on this 
project.  I would also like to thank the participants in the St. Louis University Law School’s 
Symposium on PROPERTY OWNERSHIP AND ECONOMIC STABILITY: A NECESSARY 
RELATIONSHIP? and the members of the St. Louis University Public Law Review for their work 
in putting on the Symposium and for putting out this issue of the Review. 
 1. J.W. EHRLICH, ERLICH’S BLACKSTONE 113 (1959). 
 2. Benita Jones, The Property Paradox: Limited Equity Housing Cooperatives and the 
Challenge of African-American Wealth Creation (Apr. 2007) (unpublished paper, Georgetown 
Law) (on file with author). 
 3. Shared equity housing is housing in which the increase in value of a home is shared 
between the home owner and some other party.  That party might be an investor, a governmental 
entity, a community based lender or future, as yet unknown, low income buyers of the property.  
When used in low income situations, it is a device to preserve the affordability of the property.  
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on the equity that a low-income homeowner is permitted to take out of the 
property upon its sale relegated that homeowner to a second class status.  I had 
not previously thought of the problem in these terms but instead had been a 
proponent of sharing equity as a means of preserving long-term affordability.4  
Thus, I began rethinking my position on shared equity. 
I undertook this re-examination with a working hypothesis-that property is 
a culturally constructed concept.  The content of the term depends on the 
culture in which it is employed and, within any particular culture, very often 
upon the period in which the concept is being discussed.  Joseph Singer has put 
it quite well when he said that “[p]roperty rights must be understood as both 
contingent and contextual.”5 
This essay is the result of my re-considering the idea of property in the 
context of shared equity for low income homeowners.  In the essay, I will 
examine the meaning of property in cultural, philosophical, and political 
thought.  I will then examine property in the context of the legal and political 
history of the United States.  After tracing an intellectual history of the idea of 
property in America, I will focus on modern American society and on the 
widespread and deep public regulation of private property and on the 
acceptance of this regulation by an overwhelming portion of the American 
public and its politicians.  Finally, I will consider shared equity housing and 
suggest that the limitations it imposes on the rights of an owner to retain the 
full equity of property upon its sale is not inconsistent with major strains of 
legal and political American thought and is not significantly different from 
many other restrictions on owners of property that are currently accepted as 
given (even essential) elements of our legal and cultural landscape. 
I come to this issue, I must confess, with a longstanding set of beliefs.  For 
decades, I have been interested, both academically and as a practitioner, in the 
provision (or, more precisely, the lack of provision) by society of decent, 
affordable housing for low and moderate income residents.  There is not 
enough of such housing and the shortfall has become more pressing over time.6  
More affordable units leave the housing stock each year than enter it.7 
 
See JOHN EMMEUS DAVIS, SHARED EQUITY HOMEOWNERSHIP: THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF 
RESALE-RESTRICTED, OWNER-OCCUPIED HOUSING 1–12 (2006), http://www.nhi.org/pdf/Shared 
EquityHome.pdf (providing a comprehensive discussion of shared equity housing). 
 4. See generally Michael Diamond, Rehabilitation of Low-Income Housing Through 
Cooperative Conversion by Tenants, 25 AM. U. L. REV. 285 (1976). 
 5. Joseph William Singer, Property and Social Relations: From Title to Entitlement, in 
PROPERTY AND VALUES: ALTERNATIVES TO PUBLIC AND PRIVATE OWNERSHIP 3, 10 (Charles 
Geisler & Gail Daneker eds., 2000). 
 6. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. & RESEARCH, 
AFFORDABLE HOUSING NEEDS 2005: REPORT TO CONGRESS 1–5 (2007), http://www.hud 
user.org/Publications/pdf/AffHsgNeeds.pdf. 
 7. See id. at 23–25. 
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Among the approaches to staunch the decline of decent, affordable housing 
units has been the effort to preserve the existing stock of such units and to 
improve that stock through moderate rehabilitation.  Often, this has taken the 
form of tenant ownership of affordable units.8  The acquisition and 
rehabilitation of these units by low income residents has in many instances 
been subsidized through the use of public funds.  As a partial quid pro quo for 
the use of such funds, governments often require that the deed or covenants 
that run with the land include a restraint on the alienability of the subsidized 
units; that is, there are restrictions placed on the homeowner’s ability to sell the 
unit for its full market value and to retain the proceeds.9  Critics suggest that 
this restriction dampens a major part of the American Dream; the portion in 
which homeownership is a method to accumulate wealth and, in the case of 
low income homeowners, to escape poverty.10 
This critique has led to a debate among advocates of affordable housing 
about what should be the goal of our housing policy; long-term preservation of 
affordable units through resale restrictions or wealth creation for low income 
families.  While none of the advocates for either of these positions thinks that 
the other position is unworthy, each believes that his or her own preference 
ought to have the highest societal priority.  Since the two goals-preservation 
and wealth creation-cannot, in a world of finite resources, be maximized 
simultaneously, prioritizing one goal substantially negates the ability to 
 
 8. Diamond, supra note 4, at 285, 295–96; see also Duncan Kennedy, The Limited Equity 
Coop as a Vehicle for Affordable Housing in a Race and Class Divided Society, 46 HOW. L.J. 85 
(2002); COAL. OF NONPROFIT HOUS. & ECON. DEV., A STUDY OF LIMITED-EQUITY 
COOPERATIVES IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 23–27 (2004), http://www.cnhed.org/image/ 
123800_c_sU127242_s_i189945/Coop%20Study%20PDF.pdf. 
 9. See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. § 203.41 (2009) (Federal Housing Administration regulation that 
requires affordable covenants and land leases to have resale restrictions). 
§ 203.41(d)(1): 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in the HOME Investment Partnerships (HOME) and the 
Homeownership and Opportunity for People Everywhere (HOPE) programs, the 
mortgagor may be prohibited from selling the property at a price greater than the price 
permitted under the program, or the mortgagor may be required to pay a portion of the 
sales proceeds to a governmental body or an eligible nonprofit organization, as long as the 
mortgagor is not prohibited from recovering: 
(i) The sum of the mortgagor’s original purchase price, the mortgagor’s reasonable costs 
of sale, the reasonable costs of improvements made by the mortgagor, and any negative 
amortization on a graduated payment mortgage insured under § 203.45 of this part; and 
(ii) A reasonable share, as determined by the Secretary, of the appreciation in value which 
shall be the sale price reduced by the sum determined under paragraph (d)(1)(I) of this 
section. 
 10. See DAVIS, supra note 3, at 9–10 (weighing the claims and criticisms of shared equity 
housing from the viewpoint of individual versus community wealth creation). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
88 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXIX:85 
achieve the other.  Attempts at some form of “splitting the difference” between 
them has left each side unsatisfied.  This conundrum, what I have called in 
another paper “the conflict of competing social goods,”11 leaves one pondering 
how society ought to choose among incommensurable goals.12 
While that conundrum remains perplexing, I want to move beyond it and 
continue an exploration of the cultural construction of property that I began in 
the Cultural Construction of Property paper.  In this paper, I want to extend 
that inquiry and examine the various meanings of property and ownership in 
American legal and political history.  In particular I want to look at whether the 
resale restraints placed on publicly financed affordable homeownership units 
really stray very far from the mainstream of our understanding of property and 
its use. 
In Part II of the paper, I describe the nature of the restrictions often placed 
on the resale of publicly financed housing and describe the contours of the 
debate over those restrictions.  In Part III, I briefly revisit the philosophic and 
cultural aspects of the concept of property.  In Part IV, I discuss the legal and 
political meaning of property through American history and the complexities 
of its meaning today.  In Part V, I argue that the resale restrictions placed on 
some subsidized homeowners are appropriate elements of public policy and are 
in keeping with a major strain of understanding in American legal and political 
thinking about the meaning of property. Moreover, they are consistent with 
other restrictions currently placed on private property in order to meet 
overriding public concerns. 
II.  RESALE RESTRICTIONS ON PUBLICLY FINANCED AFFORDABLE 
HOMEOWNERSHIP 
Many states and local jurisdictions have created programs for financing 
and rehabilitating affordable housing units.13  Of these, many provide for 
 
 11. Michael Diamond, Affordable Housing and the Conflict of Competing Goods: A Policy 
Dilemma, in AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS (Nestor M. Davidson 
& Robin Paul Malloy eds., 2009). 
 12. Id. 
 13. See Tenant Opportunity to Purchase Act, D.C. CODE § 42-3404.02 (2001) (giving 
tenants the opportunity to buy residential rental housing when it is offered for sale); Housing 
Production Trust Fund, D.C. CODE § 42-2802 (2001) (establishing a dedicated fund for the 
development of affordable housing); http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/pihcc/housing_trust_fund_ 
websites.pdf (providing a list of state housing trust funds); First Right to Purchase Program, D.C. 
MUN. REGS. tit. 14, §§ 2700–2799 (1983) (for the regulations governing one of the District of 
Columbia’s non-trust fund programs for financing affordable housing).  Many other types of 
programs assist or encourage the development and improvement of affordable housing.  See, e.g., 
N.Y. Affordable Housing Tax Exemption Program, N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a 
(McKinney 2007); California Housing Element Statute, CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 65580–65589.8 
(West 2007) (requires a “fair share” approach to housing where local government must take into 
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homeownership opportunities for low income residents.14  Often, in exchange 
for very favorable public financing, the borrower must agree to restrictions on 
the amount of equity the borrower can retain when the unit is sold.  The 
provisions implementing the restrictions are usually found in the deed or in 
covenants that run with the land.  The limitations may be expressed as a 
formulaic increase in the borrower’s permitted equity based on such factors as 
the amount of the down payment, the cost of improvements made to the 
property, the amortization of the mortgage and the length of ownership.  The 
borrower/seller may typically recover what he or she put into the property plus 
some factor that is based on length of tenure.  The balance of the equity 
remains in the property as a subsidy to the next qualified buyer. 
A variation on this theme is that the full equity is available at settlement 
but the amount of equity above what is permissible under the formula is 
remitted to the lending jurisdiction to replenish its capital for further lending to 
low income homebuyers.  A major drawback of this variation is that by 
permitting the full equity to be withdrawn at the time of resale, there is a risk 
that the unit will be forever removed from the affordable stock.  On the other 
hand, it gives the lender additional capital to subsidize further units.  In my 
view, the first method is preferable to the second because it preserves the 
affordability of the unit.  However, in today’s economic crisis, the availability 
of funds to subsidize the next affordable unit is so limited that it might be 
 
consideration accommodation of their local housing needs.  Mandates municipalities to tailor 
their real estate development policies to aid in the production of new housing for all income 
groups); Massachusetts Low and Moderate Income Housing Act, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40B, §§ 
20–23 (2009) (in a municipality where less than 10% of its housing qualifies as affordable a 
developer can override local zoning rules to build new developments as long as 20% of the new 
units have long-term affordability restrictions); New Jersey Fair Housing Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 
52:27D-301–307 (West 2009) (municipality’s land use regulations must be revised to encourage 
the development of affordable housing and contain measures to keep the low income units 
affordable). 
 14. The federal government has programs promoting homeownership. For an example, see 
the federal First Time Homebuyer Credit, 26 U.S.C. §§ 36(a)–(b)(1)(A) (2006) (providing an 
income tax credit of up to $8,000 for first time homebuyers).  For state programs, see the 
California tax credit, CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 17059 (West 2009) (offering a credit of $10,000 
or 5% of the home’s price, whichever is less for new home buyers).  See also Tenant Opportunity 
to Purchase Act, D.C. CODE § 42-3404.02 (2001) (giving tenants the opportunity to buy 
residential rental housing when it is offered for sale); First Right to Purchase Program, D.C. MUN. 
REGS. tit. 14, §§ 2700–2799 (1983) (for the regulations governing one of the District of 
Columbia’s non-trust fund programs for financing affordable housing); City of Buffalo, Urban 
Homestead Program, http://www.ci.buffalo.ny.us/Home/City_Departments/RealEstate/Urban 
HomesteadProgram (last visited Feb. 1, 2010) (describing Buffalo’s Urban Homestead Program); 
see generally Mother Earth News, Urban Homesteading, http://www.motherearthnews.com/ 
Modern-Homesteading/1980-09-01/Community-Homesteading-Programs.aspx (last visited Feb. 
1, 2010). 
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beneficial to put funds back into the lender’s coffers if it could be assured that 
the lender would make new affordable housing loans.15 
In an alternative form of limitation there is no restriction placed directly on 
the equity that the borrower/seller can take from the property upon resale.  
Instead, the constraint lies in to whom the borrower/seller may re-sell the 
property.  This is usually expressed as a limitation in the deed or in covenants 
that run with the land as to who may be a financially eligible buyer.  This is 
typically a household at or below a fixed percentage of the area median income 
(AMI).  This creates an equity limitation in that the resale price, when 
calculated as the amount the new buyer would have to pay on a monthly basis 
to amortize the mortgage (plus certain other specified housing costs, such as 
utilities, taxes and insurance), would have to be within 30% of the monthly 
income for someone at the top of the eligible income bracket.16 
With either form of restriction, the original buyer is permitted to secure 
some degree of benefit from the investment aspect of homeownership.  The 
balance of the equity, however, remains, directly or indirectly for use by future 
low income home buyers.  These restrictions provide obvious benefits to 
society from the long term preservation of affordable housing but there are also 
costs.  Society might have funds tied up for a considerable period in each 
building it assists.  This would limit, in the aggregate, the number of units or 
households that could be assisted. 
There are costs to the individual borrower as well.  When that borrower 
seeks to sell his or her unit, that seller may not be able to obtain enough net 
proceeds to permit him or her to buy a home in the unsubsidized market.  Thus, 
not only will the seller potentially remain in poverty, but the society will be 
faced with the problem of providing another affordable unit, perhaps through a 
new subsidy, to the low income seller. 
Of course, if there were no restrictions on the resale of the unit, the 
borrower, theoretically, could capture all of the equity through a sale to a 
market rate buyer.  This might aid the seller in escaping poverty but it creates 
the risk that the unit will be made too expensive for another low income buyer 
to afford.  Thus an affordable unit will have left the market with the great 
likelihood of not being replaced.  This would result in a further shortage of 
 
 15. There are other reasons why I believe this variation is inefficient.  The amount of equity 
being withdrawn in any resale will probably not equal the amount of subsidy originally provided.  
Moreover, it is likely that, over time, the price of housing will increase making the original 
subsidy potentially inadequate even if the full amount of the subsidy is withdrawn.  In addition, 
there are significant transaction costs associated with the recapture and relending of the funds.  
Finally, there can be only limited current assurances that the funds recaptured will be re-used in 
the affordable housing arena.  The major inefficiency, of course, is that an affordable unit is likely 
to leave the housing stock with no likelihood of a replacement entering the market. 
 16. See, e.g., FAIR HOUSING RHODE ISLAND, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE GUIDE app. 8, at 40 
(2007), http://www.fairhousingri.org/techguide/11_LongtrmAff_ResaleRestQA.pdf. 
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affordable housing at the expense of future low income individuals and, 
ultimately, of the society. 
III.  THE CONCEPT OF PROPERTY ACROSS TIME AND CULTURE 
As I have indicated, the concept of property has varied over time and 
between cultures.  In this section, I will give a brief overview of some of the 
significant variations in meaning.  Some of these will be reprised in Part IV as 
the underpinnings of American legal thought about the meaning and use of 
property. 
A. Traditional Non Western Views of Land Ownership 
As early as the 6th century BCE, Confucius developed a complex view of 
property that combined significant elements of what were to become the 
market economies of capitalist culture along with a more communalist view in 
which the state was obliged to secure for the people the basic means of their 
subsistence.  He called for an interventionist model and supported, for 
example, a fair distribution of goods.17  This view was reiterated by Mensius, a 
follower of Confucius, who, while affirming the concept of private property, 
also argued that the government should control the distribution and use of land 
to assure the subsistence of the people.18 
Similarly, the traditional Islamic view of property rights conceived of a 
dual ownership of property between a human being and Allah.  The land was 
thought to be a sacred trust that must be used productively but without 
exploitation or hoarding.19  Thus, the land owner may benefit from his or her 
land but only within a circumscribed range.  The concept was not one of 
unlimited dominion.  Property rights were essentially either public, state, or 
private.  Private rights depended on use and public lands might be converted to 
the private realm by productive use of such land.  On the other hand, private, 
unused land might revert to the state.  The public nature of the ownership of 
land in traditional Islamic law was that landowners were required to pay a levy 
of a part of the earnings from the land for the benefit of the poor.  This levy 
was not viewed as voluntary charity but as a social obligation and, 
correlatively, as a right of the poor to receive.20 
Various Native American Nations have also viewed property rights 
differently from those of the archetypal western model.  While most 
recognized individual rights in personal property, their view of rights in land 
 
 17. Daniel A. Bell, Confucian Constraints on Property Rights, in CONFUCIANISM FOR THE 
MODERN WORLD 222–25 (Daniel A. Bell & Hahm Chaibong eds., 2003). 
 18. Id. at 237, 239. 
 19. SIRAJ SAIT & HILARY LIM, LAND, LAW AND ISLAM: PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
THE MUSLIM WORLD 11 (2006). 
 20. Id. at 12–14. 
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varied widely.  Many nations did not recognize individual property interests in 
land.  In some cases this was because tribes were nomadic and such interests 
were not relevant to their existence or were even adverse to it.21  Others had a 
more communal or even spiritual sense about the land.  They viewed the land 
as belonging to all and no individual could exercise complete dominion over 
it.22  While individuals who occupied particular land could enjoy the fruits of 
their labor, they had an obligation to preserve the land for future generations.  
They merely used the land in trust, an example of tenure from which the 
stewardship concept developed.23 
B. The Western Legal Tradition 
For more than two millennia, thinkers have considered the nature and 
meaning of property.  Variants have run the gamut from communal ownership 
to stewardship to absolute dominion.  For example, Plato had rejected the 
concept of private property and argued instead for commonly owned property.  
Rulers would have no private property while other property would be held for 
the common good.24  Thomas More and Karl Marx echoed the call for 
communally owned property, More espoused a humanist Christian perspective 
that in order to avoid the otherwise certain oppression of the poor, private 
property should be abolished and property should be held communally.25 
 
 21. Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 87 (1985). 
 22. PAUL H. CARLSON, THE PLAINS INDIANS 111 (1998). 
 23. See Lynton Keith Caldwell, Land and the Law: Problems in Legal Philosophy, 1986 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 319 (1986) (contrasting the stewardship ethic with the typical American concept of 
land dominion). 
 24. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 161–63 (H.D.P. Lee trans., Penguin Books 1962). 
 25. See THOMAS MORE, UTOPIA 30 (PF Collier & Son, Colonial Press 1901) (1516). 
Though to speak plainly my real sentiments, I must freely own that as long as there is any 
property, and while property is the standard of all other things, I cannot think that a nation 
can be governed either justly or happily: not justly, because the best things will fall to the 
share of the worst men; nor happily, because all things will be divided among a few and 
even these are not in all respects happy), the rest being left to be absolutely miserable. 
See also Peter W. Salsich Jr., Property Law Serves Human Society: A First-Year Course Agenda, 
46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 617, 617–18 (2002). 
The religious concept of stewardship is derived from the belief that all material goods, 
including land, belonged to God.  The earth and everything in it was created by God.  
Humankind was created in the image and likeness of God and given dominion over 
material goods of the earth.  Since all humans are created in God’s likeness, all have a 
claim to the earth’s bounty.  Individuals may appropriate what they need for their own 
sustenance and development but only what they need.  Civil title to land, while giving the 
holder substantial power to possess, use, and dispose of that land, is not absolute.  With 
title comes a responsibility to care for the land and use it wisely for the betterment of the 
landowner, the landowner’s community, and future generations.  The landowner, as 
steward, will ultimately be asked to give an accounting of that use to God, the Master. 
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Marx believed, as did many of the English economic philosophers, that 
property involved an interaction between people and things, not, as is a 
common belief today, a relationship between person and person.  He went on 
to argue, however, that property in private hands tended toward an inequitable 
power relationship between people, those that had property and those who had 
not.  In order to retain the classical view of property as a relationship between 
a person and an object, and to avoid the oppression of the propertyless class, 
property had to be held by the public rather than by private individuals.26 
There are among western thinkers, of course, differing views of property.  
John Locke, for example, is widely viewed as the progenitor of the market 
sense of property.  According to Locke, property rights pre-date the political 
state and arise from the labor of the first occupier.27  Government, according to 
Locke, was designed to protect the property rights of its citizens and was not to 
interfere with their use of their property.28  But even Locke placed restrictions 
on the use of property.  One may only take as much as one can use before it 
spoils and one must leave “enough and as good” for others.  This recognition 
of the limits of private ownership is as much a part of Locke as the recognition 
of the right to private ownership. 
At about the same time Locke was writing about individual rights of 
property as a protection against encroachment by others, The Diggers (or 
Levelers) were arguing for communal ownership to preserve the right to 
subsistence for all people.  Such access to “soil and to subsistence were 
fundamental to freedom.”29  Levelers such as Gerrard Winstanley protested the 
enclosures of land by wealthy individuals that deprived the poor of access to 
life’s necessities.  He argued for communal cultivation of the commons as the 
antidote to the despotic power of the wealthy.30 
Of course, Blackstone took a different view.  At least rhetorically, he 
claimed that owners of property had absolute right over its use and 
disposition.31  Even as he was writing, the State had already intervened in 
 
 26. KARL MARX & FREDERICK ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 52 (Verso 1998) 
(1848). 
The distinguishing feature of communism is not the abolition of property generally, but 
the abolition of bourgeois property.  But modern bourgeois private property is the final 
and most complete expression of the system of producing and appropriating products that 
is based on class antagonisms, on the exploitation of the many by the few. 
 27. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT §§ 26–29, at 20 (Prometheus 
Books 1986) (1690).  For a discussion of Locke’s views of property, see ITAI SENED, THE 
POLITICAL INSTITUTION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY (1997). 
 28. See LOCKE, supra note 27, §§ 138–140, at 77–79. 
 29. LAURA BRACE, THE POLITICS OF PROPERTY: LABOUR, FREEDOM AND BELONGING 14 
(2004). 
 30. Id. at 19. 
 31. ERLICH, supra note 1, at 113. 
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private property.32  There were restrictions on its use and disposition as well as 
it being subject to taxation.  Moreover, restrictions on the use of property had 
been in place in England even before Blackstone began writing about 
“Despotic Dominion.”33 Nevertheless, his claim has had great purchase among 
writers about property and its theme has significantly penetrated the common 
consciousness about property and ownership. 
C. Aspects of Property in Relation to Individuals 
Several theories have been developed about property ownership and the 
individual.  One, the idea of personhood, argues that one’s right to act as a free 
individual must be supported by elements allowing self expression.34  Among 
these would be one’s right to possess and use private property.  There is a good 
deal of evidence suggesting that homeownership does, in fact, involve 
elements of self expression, autonomy and social capital.35 
A second theory derives from Adam Smith and utilizes economic 
efficiency as a basis for property rights.  Private ownership promotes efficient 
use of property in the owner’s self interest.  This, in turn, promotes an 
economically efficient society.  Under this theory, private decisions as to one’s 
self interest, spread over a large universe of owners, will aggregate toward the 
social good-the invisible hand writ large.  Of course, the debate over the ability 
of the market to order society in a proper manner has been active for years and 
is prominently featured in the current public discourse. 
Morris Cohen criticizes both of these theories.  Concerning personhood, he 
argues that property rights also deny elements of personhood in that they 
 
 32. See, e.g., John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and its Significance for Modern Takings 
Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252 (1996).  In discussing the notion of minimal land use 
regulation during the American Colonial period, Hart states “. . . in fact, colonial governments 
regulated land use extensively for purposes other than preventing harm.” Id. at 1253. 
 33. For a discussion of the English antecedents to the American system of the regulation of 
property (among other elements of regulation), see WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S 
WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1996). 
 34. See, e.g., MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 35 (1993). 
 35. See, e.g., William M. Rohe et al., The Social Benefits and Costs of Homeownership: A 
Critical Assessment of the Research 16–17 (Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies of Harvard Univ., 
Working Paper No. LIHO-0.1.12, 2001), http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/home 
ownership/liho01-12.pdf (stating protection of economic interest, transaction costs of moving and 
identification with one’s home as reasons for increased participation among homeowners); 
WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 4 (2001); DAVIS, supra note 3, at 110 
(“Limited equity cooperatives help to create a space to reconnect local activism with the 
neighborhood by enforcing values of civic participation and creating spaces for interaction.  The 
social and leadership skills that are learned in LECs increase residents’ resources and motivation 
for civic participation.”) (quoting Saegert et al., Limited Equity Co-ops as Bulwarks against 
Gentrification (2003) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with City University of New York 
Graduate Center)). 
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include the right to exclude others, thereby at least potentially depriving those 
others of their right of self assertion.36  Cohen’s criticism of both the 
personhood and efficiency arguments is that they fail to look out for the overall 
societal good.  Private property cannot, he claims, be sacrosanct and free of 
any government restriction. 
The issue before thoughtful people is therefore not the maintenance or 
abolition of private property, but the determination of the precise lines along 
which private enterprise must be given free scope and where it must be 
restricted in the interests of the common good.37 
Tom Bethell, a writer in the market/commodification tradition of property 
has, nevertheless, struck a similar chord by stating: “Private property is a 
compromise between our desire for unrestricted liberty and the recognition that 
others have similar desires and rights.”38  Bruce Ackerman, writing in quite a 
different tradition, has echoed this position.  He has stated, more bluntly, that: 
[O]nly the ignorant think it meaningful to talk about owning things free and 
clear of further obligation. . . .More precisely, the law of property considers the 
way rights to use things may be parceled out amongst a host of competing 
resource users.39 
These admonitions have been regularly heeded by modern societies.  
Consider the wide range of restrictions that are now accepted by virtually 
everyone in many industrialized societies.  Fair housing and public 
accommodations laws limit one’s ability to exclude others from one’s property.  
Zoning rules tell us how large a building may be and the use to which it may 
be put.  Building and housing codes tell us how buildings must be constructed 
and what amenities they must contain.  Warranties of habitability and rent 
control laws restrict landlord behavior and income.  Environmental laws limit 
uses and emissions of and from buildings.  Taxes deprive the owner of some of 
the value of land and different uses produce different tax obligations, thereby 
steering behavior.  Finally, the most far-reaching of the limitations on property, 
the right of the government to take private property for public use, was 
recently very broadly defined by the Supreme Court.40 
As has been shown in this section, a wide range of views have been 
applied to the concept of property.  Many of them provide a counterpoint to 
Blackstone’s “despotic dominion” hypothesis.  In the following section, I will 
examine how the concept of property developed in the American legal-
political-social context. 
 
 36. Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L. Q. 8, 11–12 (1928). 
 37. Id. at 21. 
 38. TOM BETHELL, THE NOBLEST TRIUMPH: PROPERTY AND PROSPERITY THROUGH THE 
AGES 9 (1998). 
 39. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 26 (1977). 
 40. See Kelo v. New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
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IV.  THE MEANING OF PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 
Throughout this nation’s history, there has been a struggle between those 
who believe that we have a collective responsibility, through, but not limited 
to, government, to “promote the general welfare” and those who assert that the 
general welfare is and should be best achieved by all pursuing their own self-
interest via “the Market,” with government doing as little as possible, apart 
from providing for the common defense.41 
Historically, the concept of property has had many meanings and has 
fulfilled many goals in civil society.  This has also been true in American legal 
and political history, which includes a rich vein to the effect that the idea of 
property includes a significant social component.  To be sure, there is also a 
significant vein of thought, in fact the prevalent one, which views property as 
being wholly within the control of an owner.  We, as a society, view property 
as a commodity, a means of exchange that helps to order private interactions 
and fulfill private preferences.42  Yet, as Joseph Singer points out, that 
domination has always been more theoretical (or mythical) than real. 
If we observe the operation of private property systems, we see that full 
consideration of property rights in the same person is the exception, rather than 
the rule; most property rights are shared or divided among several persons.43 
The way that these interests are divided may tell us something about the 
nature of property in the United States.  Gregory Alexander, for example, has 
posited that two strains of theoretical discourse have been present in American 
legal thought throughout our history.  The first treats property as a commodity 
and corresponds to the prevalent view today that property is an item of private 
exchange that allows individuals to pursue their preferences in the market.  
This involves a negative sense of liberty in that it assumes individuals are free 
to order their relationships unfettered by interference from government.  The 
second strain, what Alexander, borrowing from Carol Rose, calls “propriety,” 
addresses the use of property to create and maintain the “good society,” 
whatever that may be.44  In this vision, property has a public function beyond 
any private use. 
 
 41. Rachel G. Bratt et al., Why a Right to Housing Is Needed and Makes Sense: Editors 
Introduction, in A RIGHT TO HOUSING: FOUNDATION FOR A NEW SOCIAL AGENDA 8 (Rachel G. 
Bratt et al. eds., 2006). 
 42. GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF 
PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 1 (1997). 
 43. Singer, supra note 5, at 6. 
 44. ALEXANDER, supra note 42, at 1. 
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While several writers have contested this second view,45 there has been 
much American legal writing to the effect that property should serve, at least to 
some extent, the public good.  This strain, however, may not be matched by a 
societal implementation of its prescriptions.  Moreover, even for those who 
consider public benefit a proper purpose for property, there is a debate about 
what is a public benefit. 
My goal in this section is not to resolve the dispute between those who 
believe our government was established to protect (and, in fact, has protected) 
interests of the propertied class and those who believe that the government was 
established to regulate (and has regulated) property in the public interest.  
Instead, in this section I want merely to describe some of the major arguments 
on each side of this issue.  I will distinguish normative, theoretical positions 
from descriptive ones and examine how the government has for generations 
regulated private property, at least to some extent, in the public interest and 
against the interests of individual title holders. 
A. Individualism and Commodification 
Any discussion of individual property rights and the commodification of 
property hearkens back, of course, to John Locke and the primacy of individual 
liberty.  He, and many others, believed that property was a major bulwark 
against encroachments on such liberty by the state.  This belief has become the 
basis for many of the legal protections and rights that Americans enjoy today.46  
David Abraham makes an argument that throughout much of American 
history, concepts such as freedom of contract and private property were 
protected by the law and the courts with the effect that neither government nor 
other individuals could intrude on the freedom provided by these devices.  
Citing Lochner v. New York47 and similar cases, Abraham argues that: 
Never again did the formal equality of contract so fully displace the social 
realities that produce contract relations.  In this view, exchanges of property in 
the market are not only guaranteed freedom but were indeed the very 
expression of it.48 
He goes on to quote Edward Corwin critically commenting that the goal of 
the Supreme Court seemed to have been to “annex the principles of laissez-
faire capitalism to the Constitution and put them beyond the reach of state 
legislative power.”49 
 
 45. See, e.g., JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM (1990); David Abraham, Liberty Without Equality: The Property-Rights 
Connection in a “Negative Citizenship” Regime, 21 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1 (1996). 
 46. See NEDELSKY, supra note 45, at 8–9. 
 47. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 48. Abraham, supra note 45, at 18. 
 49. Id. (quoting EDWARD CORWIN, THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT 78 (1934)). 
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Abraham tracks the negative liberty impulse from the founding of the 
nation to the present.  He argues that the few periods when the legislatures and 
courts broke free from the regnant idea of property as a basis for negative 
liberty, Reconstruction, the New Deal, and the Civil Rights era, really were 
just slight and temporary inroads into the primacy of private property as an 
ordering mechanism for society and a source of rights and power.  He quotes 
Margaret Radin, who he calls the successor to Reich in the age of Rorty, as 
stating: 
[T]he best strategy for making gains for the less well-off. . . [is] to drive a 
wedge in the ideological justification of property by showing that only a very 
small portion of private property rights serve the purposes claimed for property 
in general, rather than attempting to disrupt the ideology of property. . . [I] do 
not think. . . that the ideology of property can be dislodged:50 
Jennifer Nedelsky also believes that the nation was founded on the 
Lockean view of protection of property rights as the means to protect liberty.  
She claims that “The Framers’ preoccupation with property generated a 
shallow conception of democracy and a system of institutions that allocates 
political power unequally and fails to foster political participation.”51 She goes 
on to say “For the Framers, the protection of property meant the protection of 
unequal property and thus the insulation of both property and inequality from 
democratic transformation.”52 
While Nedelsky recognizes that the Constitutional Convention proceeded 
with a great deal of collaboration and compromise, she believes that the 
Federalists and their Lockean view of property and rights carried the day.53  
She argues that the conflict between personal rights and property rights was 
resolved in favor of property.  Her hypothesis is that all people had an interest 
in, and thus favored, personal rights while only the propertied classes had an 
interest in property rights.  Thus, to protect those rights from the masses of the 
unpropertied, Constitutional safeguards protecting those rights were created.  
This was a largely non-democratic position and made the political rights of the 
masses subservient to the property rights of the few.54 
Abraham and Nedelsky have developed a descriptive view of how the 
sense of property has evolved in American legal and political thought.  There 
are, of course, many who view this evolution as the normatively correct path.  
One, Tom Bethell, has claimed that the “secure, decentralized, private 
 
 50. Id. at 28 (quoting Margaret Jane Radin, Lacking a Transformative Social Theory, 45 
STAN. L. REV. 409 (1993)). 
 51. NEDELSKY, supra note 45, at 1. 
 52. Id. at 2. 
 53. Nedelsky asserts that the Federalist James Wilson “was the only member of the 
Constitutional Convention to proclaim that property was not the object of government.”  Id. at 12. 
 54. Id. at 5. 
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ownership of goods,” is a necessary but not sufficient condition for obtaining 
the “four great blessings . . . . [of] liberty, justice, peace and prosperity.”55  But 
even Bethell recognizes the fact that property does not carry absolute rights but 
is a compromise of various, often conflicting, interests.56 
B. Property as an Instrument of Social Good 
The primacy of private property in American thought can be seen in the 
number of writers, on both the left and right of the political spectrum, who 
extol or bemoan its pre-eminent political position.  For example, Tony Honoré 
has written “If under the system of entitlements the interest awarded to owners 
is greater than can reasonably be justified on moral, as opposed to economic 
grounds, any resultant distribution of property must be inherently unjust.”57 He 
goes on to say “[T]his western system of property law is neither the only 
conceivable one, nor the easiest to justify from a moral point of view.”58 
In fact, Gregory Alexander has argued that two quite different strains of 
theory have characterized American legal and political thought since colonial 
times.59  The first, the idea of property as a commodity for market exchange is 
in dialectic opposition to the second, property as propriety60  The proprietarian 
views of property, as Alexander sees them, have a 
 “. . .commitment to the basic idea that the core purpose of property is not to 
satisfy individual preferences or to increase wealth but to fulfill some prior 
normative vision of how society and the polity that governs it should be 
structured.”61 
 
 55. BETHELL, supra note 38, at 9. 
 56. Id. 
 57. TONY HONORÉ, MAKING LAW BIND 218 (1987).  For a contrary view, see Thomas W. 
Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1849 (2007). 
 58. See HONORÉ, supra note 57, at 218. 
 59. ALEXANDER, supra note 42, at 1. 
For too long now, legal scholars have tended to accept uncritically the claim that there has 
been a single tradition of property throughout American history.  Property, according to 
this mistaken view, has served one core purpose and has had a single constant meaning 
throughout American history: to define in material terms the legal and political sphere 
within which individuals are free to pursue their own private agendas and satisfy their 
own preferences, free from governmental coercion or other forms of external interference.  
Property, according to this understanding, is the foundation of the categorical separation 
of the realm of the private and public, individual and collectivity, the market and the 
polity. 
 60. Alexander borrows this term from Carol Rose.  It denotes property as a foundation for 
the creation and maintenance of the good society, whatever that may be; the “private basis for the 
public good.”  Id. 
 61. Id. at 2. 
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He argues that such views were already well established in Europe and that 
the pre-revolutionary American legal intellectuals were heirs to that tradition62 
and the rest of the book offers evidence of the degree to which these views 
continued to percolate in our legal and political thought until the late twentieth 
century.  He concludes that 
There is no single American traditional meaning of property. . .Rather, there 
have been multiple meanings and multiple traditions of property throughout 
our history.63 
Joseph William Singer, echoing the legal realists, also criticizes the 
classical view of property suggesting that we should (and that we do) 
disaggregate the bundle of property rights and discuss particular entitlements 
as separate components.64  He believes property should be viewed as relations 
among people rather than between people and things and, in doing so, 
distinguishes between classical concepts of title and his preferred model of 
informal relations and moral claims.65 
C. The Application of the Proprietarian Meaning of Property in American 
Political History 
Throughout history, we have repeatedly seen government intrude upon the 
classic liberal conception of property in order to further some broader social 
purpose.  What is more, these intrusions have been accepted as reasonable and 
essential parts of our society by all but the most zealous Lochnerians.  To take 
but a few early examples, New York passed a law in the late 1860’s 
prohibiting commercial activities along Frederick Law Olmstead’s new 
Eastern Parkway in Brooklyn, NY.66  Such rules became comprehensive in 
1916 as New York passed the first citywide zoning ordinance.  Within ten 
years, ordinances such as New York’s were upheld by the United States 
Supreme Court in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.67  Zoning ordinances 
such as these limited what an owner could do with his or her property and, 
given an acceptable use, limited the size, location and height of improvements 
on the property. 
 
 62. Id. at 8, 384–85. 
 63. ALEXANDER, supra note 42, at 7. 
 64. Singer, supra note 5, at 8. 
 65. Id. at 4–5, 8. 
 66. IRVING D. FISHER, FREDERICK LAW OLMSTED AND THE CITY PLANNING MOVEMENT IN 
THE UNITED STATES 134 (1986); Keith D. Revell, Regulating the Landscape: Real Estate Values, 
City Planning and the 1916 Zoning Ordinance, in THE LANDSCAPE OF MODERNITY: NEW YORK 
CITY 1900-1940 19 (David Ward & Olivier Zunz eds., 1997). 
 67. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
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Similarly, New York passed the Tenement House Act of 1867 which 
regulated light, air and facilities in residential buildings.68  These laws evolved 
into modern building and housing codes that regulate building materials, 
amenities, and general health and safety requirements.69  Progressing along the 
legal continuum of the state protecting citizens from the dangers caused by 
inadequate or too expensive housing, we have the warranty of habitability70 
and rent control laws.71  It takes little imagination to recognize the inroads 
these provisions have made on the despotic dominion owners have over 
property.  Such rules require landlords of residential rental housing to maintain 
the property up to the standards of the local housing codes and restrict the 
amount that can be charged as rent.  They affect the value of the property to the 
owner and the owner’s ability to do with his or her property as he or she 
pleases.72 
Another area in which widely accepted government regulation invades one 
of the central sticks in the classical bundle constituting ownership is the right 
to exclude.  Fair housing and public accommodation laws have made it illegal 
to exclude individuals from one’s property for various demographic reasons 
such as race, gender, national origin, sexual preference, family status, source of 
funds, etc.  The underlying rationale for these and other such rules is the need 
for public good to override private rights. 
V.  THE CONCEPT OF PROPERTY AND SHARED EQUITY HOUSING 
There is today a significant shortage of affordable housing units and new 
affordable units enter the market at a very slow pace.73  At the same time the 
demand for such units is growing due to an increase in the number of 
households in need of such units.74  In addition to an increased demand for 
units, the number of affordable units being lost to the overall stock continues to 
 
 68. See RICHARD PLUNZ, A HISTORY OF HOUSING IN NEW YORK CITY: DWELLING TYPE 
AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE AMERICAN METROPOLIS 22 (1990).  In 1856, the State of New 
York created a commission to study substandard housing.  Id. at 21.  In 1866, the legislature 
passed a law setting constructing standards, and in 1867 the first Tenement Housing Act was 
passed.  Id. at 22.  The Tenement Housing Act was subsequently amended and expanded upon in 
1879, 1901, and again in 1919.  Id. at 24, 85, 123. 
 69. See, e.g., N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE §§ 25-301, 26-405, 27-102, 28-101.2 (2009). 
 70. See Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1970); N.Y. GEN. 
LAWS ch. 334, 1901 (repealed 1909). 
 71. D.C. CODE ANN. § 42-3501.01 (LexisNexis 2003); N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § 26-501 
(2009). 
 72. Other laws that restrict the economic rights of owners include environmental statutes 
such as 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a) (2006); 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2006); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-1451.01 
(LexisNexis Supp. 2009); D.C. CODE ANN. § 42-3404.02 (LexisNexis Supp. 2009); and 42 
U.S.C. § 12101 (2006) to name a few. 
 73. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., supra note 6, at 36. 
 74. Id. at 37. 
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grow due to market conditions, owner choice and deterioration.75  Since the 
gap between supply and demand is growing, it is critically important for 
society to preserve the existing stock of affordable units while increasing the 
supply of such units.  Use restrictions is one method of preserving affordable 
units.  These restrictions have the effect of sharing the equity in any for sale 
unit with the next buyer or with the society as a whole. 
In this section I will pay particular attention to the idea of shared equity as 
a means of assisting low income buyers to purchase a home and will conclude 
with a discussion of the ethical validity of use restrictions on subsidized 
homeowners.  I will argue that not only are such restrictions instrumental in 
achieving a valued social goal but also that the potential reduction of owner 
equity as a result of the restraint is not a significant departure from generally 
accepted restrictions on property. 
As I stated earlier, the concept of shared equity housing is, essentially, that 
some investor, private or public, assists a home buyer in the purchase of a 
home.  In exchange, the investor requires a share of the equity.  In a private 
situation, that share is typically distributed directly to the investor at a pre-
determined point or upon re-sale of the property.  The distribution is the 
entrepreneurial return for the use of the investor’s funds and for his or her risk. 
There are many examples of this form of shared equity in today’s housing 
market.  Perhaps the most ubiquitous is that of a parent helping a child 
purchase a home.  There has been a long tradition of the parent or other 
relative or friend making a contribution to a down payment in exchange for a 
portion of the equity upon resale.76  This model has expanded beyond family 
and friends as financial contributors and has become a form of business 
investment.77  Evidence suggests that many investors and homeowners desire 
this type of arrangement over currently available mortgage products.78  Thus, 
the concept of shared equity housing has not been limited to the poor 
homebuyer but has spread to all segments of the market, including homebuyers 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. For a discussion of the private shared equity process, see Judy Newman, Balancing the 
Cost: Shared Equity Home Ownership Addresses Affordable Housing Needs, ON COMMON 
GROUND (Nat’l Ass’n of Realtors, Washington, D.C.), Winter 2008, at 10, 12, 
http://www.realtor.org/smart_growth.nsf/docfiles/winter08_balancing_costs.pdf/$file/winter08_b
alancing_costs.pdf (discussing the rise of shared equity homeownership and the costs associated 
with it); see also Lending Tree, LLC, Buying a Home with a Shared-Equity Mortgage, 
http://www.lendingtree.com/smartborrower/first-time-home-buyers/buying/buy-home-shared-
equity-mortgage/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2010). 
 77. ANDREW CAPLIN ET AL., FANNIE MAE FOUND., SHARED-EQUITY MORTGAGES, 
HOUSING AFFORDABILITY, AND HOMEOWNERSHIP 3 (2007), http://cess.nyu.edu/caplin/SEM 
2007.pdf (arguing in favor of shared-equity mortgages and suggesting that the financial markets 
value shares in homeownership more highly than some homeowners). 
 78. Id. 
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looking for needed and efficient financing and investors looking to capitalize 
on historic housing returns. 
When the investor is the public, however, the goals of shared equity 
investment change.  The goal for the distribution is typically not 
entrepreneurial.  Rather, the distribution is designed to serve some public good, 
for example, preserving the property as affordable to future low income 
buyers.  Moreover, the public’s share of the equity may or may not actually be 
distributed.  The more common scheme is that the public’s equity remains in 
the property making it more affordable to the next low income buyer.  The 
original buyer may take out whatever equity was designated at the outset as his 
or her share.  Subsequent buyers would have to agree to the same arrangement 
in order to be eligible to purchase the property. 
An alternative involves the distribution of the public’s share of the equity, 
together with a payoff of the balance of the underlying mortgage, when the 
property is sold.  While this method may not preserve as affordable the 
particular unit that is being sold, it does return to the public entity a significant 
amount of capital that can be used to subsidize another low income buyer. 
A. Homeownership and Preservation 
For generations, the American Dream has included an element of 
homeownership.  From the promise of “forty acres and a mule”79 to the 
original Homestead Acts80 to the mortgage interest tax deduction,81 there has 
been a national policy of encouraging and supporting ownership.  The financial 
benefits of homeownership have been well documented and run from the 
obvious element of potential wealth creation due to price appreciation on 
homes to more opaque forms of increasing overall wealth.82  There are, 
however, other benefits of homeownership that have been identified by 
commentators.83  They include increased civic participation84 emotional 
 
 79. “Forty Acres and a Mule” refers to an order made in W.M. Sherman’s Special Field 
Order No. 15 during the Civil War on January 16, 1865. 
 80. See generally Homestead Act of May 20, 1862, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392, amended by Act of 
Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 561, 26 Stat. 1095. 
 81. See I.R.C. § 163(h)(3) (West 2009). 
 82. In addition to appreciation, wealth can be generated from building equity by amortizing 
the mortgage while, at the same time, enjoying the occupancy (and thus the rental value) of the 
property.  It can also be generated through a constant mortgage payment in the face of rising 
housing (and rental) values.  One lives in a property while paying $X while the rental value is 
>$X.  The savings over what rent increases would have been as well as the differential between 
what the homeowner pays and the value of what he or she receives are forms of wealth creation.  
See J. Peter Byrne & Michael Diamond, Affordable Housing, Land Tenure, and Urban Policy: 
The Matrix Revealed, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 527, 541–44 (2007). 
 83. For a general discussion of these benefits, see id. at 577–80. 
 84. Rohe et al., supra note 35, at 16–17. 
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benefits of pride of ownership,85 and the potential for increased capacity and 
social capital.86  Homeowners typically have the security of place and, in 
addition, their normally longer tenure offers them greater potential for creating 
and maintaining connection and community.87 
The poor, however, have been largely excluded from these benefits.  In 
many of today’s urban housing markets,88 the median price of a home is more 
than can be afforded even by buyers with occupations such as school teacher, 
fire fighter, police officer or nurse.89  Obviously, people with lower paying 
jobs would have even more difficulty purchasing a home.  The concept of 
shared equity was one method designed to rectify this imbalance and to create 
greater access to homeownership for the poor.  The model preserves 
affordability for the long term and prevents affordable units from exiting the 
market. 
There are, of course, costs associated with sharing equity.  Most 
conspicuously, the homeowners in a shared equity situation will not realize a 
portion (often, a significant portion) of the equity built up in their property.  
For the poor, this could mean the loss of an opportunity to escape poverty.  
This is the crux of the property issue here.  Is the potential loss of that equity a 
sufficient basis to argue that the shared equity homeowner has lost an essential 
element of ownership?  The remainder of this section will argue that it is not. 
 
 85. Curtis J. Berger, Home Is Where the Heart Is: A Brief Reply to Professor Epstein, 54 
BROOK. L. REV. 1239, 1242 (1989). 
 86. Byrne & Diamond, supra note 82, at 579. 
 87. Paula A. Franzese, Does It Take a Village? Privatization, Patterns of Restrictiveness and 
the Demise of Community, 47 VILL. L. REV. 553, 585 (2002) (indicating that social interaction 
builds social capital). 
 88. I am excluding the effects of the current financial situation.  While home prices have 
fallen, there is both greater unemployment and a much more difficult borrowing environment.  I 
have not seen statistics on the effect of these factors on affordability and the possibility of 
actually buying a home.  In the District of Columbia, a previously booming housing market, 
lending for low-income buyers, which had been available from both public, nonprofit, and some 
commercial sources has largely evaporated.  The public sector has run out of funds and is making 
few new loans.  The nonprofit sector had depended on take out commitments from other sources 
in order to make their short-term bridge loans and the commercial sector has, for the most part, 
abandoned this form of lending.  While there are a few commercial exceptions, even with their 
lowest interest rates in this market, their loans often make projects unaffordable for low-income 
buyers.  See Peter A. Tatian & G. Thomas Kingsley, Housing Market Update, DISTRICT OF 
COLUMBIA HOUSING MONITOR 9–10 (Winter 2008), http://www.neighborhoodinfodc.org/ 
housing/DCHousingMonitor_2008_1.pdf. 
 89. MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER ET AL., FANNIE MAE FOUND., HOUSING IN THE NATION’S 
CAPITAL 32 (2005), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/1000853_HNC2005.pdf. 
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B. The Incongruity of Disparaging Shared Equity Homeownership 
The critics of shared equity housing suggest that one of the major property 
sticks, the ability to increase one’s wealth from property appreciation, is lost 
(or at least impaired) to shared equity homebuyers.  They claim that this loss is 
what relegates such owners to a second class status.  This critique has a certain 
resonance and superficial plausibility.  Nevertheless, it is, in my view, 
misguided for at least two reasons.  First, it attempts to compare shared equity 
homeownership with non-shared-equity homeownership.  This comparison 
might be apt if the poor had the choice between the two and were forced into 
the shared equity model.  This is very unlikely to be the choice actually 
available to the poor who are more likely to have a choice, if at all, between 
shared-equity homeownership and tenancy in a rental situation.  Typically, 
housing costs in the unsubsidized market are too high and the underwriting 
requirements of lenders too stringent for most of the poor to be able to buy in 
such a market.90  Thus, while the poor may be subject to restrictions on equity 
that are not imposed on non-subsidized buyers, they have the opportunity for 
equity not available to renters, subsidized or otherwise.  Moreover, there are 
equity restrictions placed on unsubsidized homeowners.  For example, the 
capital gains tax takes a part of an owner’s equity upon resale when that equity 
passes a threshold level.91 
The second reason I believe the criticism of shared equity homeownership 
is misguided is that it assumes a static definition of homeownership that is 
neither essential nor even descriptive.  The restriction on equity is merely one 
type of restriction on ownership.  All owners endure some limitation on their 
despotic dominion over property.  As I stated at the beginning of this essay, 
property is a culturally and temporally specific construct.  In the United States, 
the understanding of property has, over time, undergone many changes and 
continues to spark debate. 
1. The Proper Comparison of Tenure Choices 
We have already discussed the problem of the shortage of affordable 
housing for low income residents.  There is not enough decent affordable 
housing to meet the demand and some of the existing stock of such housing 
leaves the market each year without being replaced.  The growing gap will 
 
 90. Map of Misery, THE ECONOMIST, May 8, 2008, at 82 (“Optimists point out that some 
measures of housing affordability have dramatically improved.  According to NAR figures, 
monthly payments on a typical house with a 30-year mortgage and 20% down payment were 
18.5% of the median family’s income in February, down almost 26% at the peak—and close to 
the historical average.  But this measure is misleading, not least because credit standards have 
tightened.  A survey of loan officers conducted by the Fed suggested on May 5th that 60% of 
banks tightened their lending standards for prime mortgages in the first three months of 2007.”). 
 91. I.R.C. § 121 (West 2008). 
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continue to cause a variety of social problems ranging from homelessness to 
poor health to disengagement from civil society.92  The concept of shared 
equity housing must, therefore, be viewed in this context.  It is a palliative that 
slows down the disintegration of the existing affordable stock.  Who is likely 
to choose this form of housing over the other possible tenures?  Typically the 
answer is the poor but that answer leaves far too much unexplained. 
Who among the poor are faced with the prospect of sharing equity?  In 
general, they fall into one of two groups: tenants who have the opportunity of 
homeownership using a program subsidized by a public entity or a social 
investor; or homeowners who are seeking to refinance their homes using such 
a program.  The need for refinancing is generally due to the owner having 
encountered financial difficulties during his or her non-shared-equity tenure.  I 
will not say much here about homeowners in financial difficulty.  Each had 
made a choice of tenure and found, for whatever reason, that it was not feasible 
to continue in that tenure.  Each, then, had to choose between a return to 
renting, which many did, or accept a form of financing that required them to 
share equity with an investor.  The choice confronting renters is quite different.  
Typically, they do not have the opportunity to acquire non-shared-equity 
housing.  Income, housing prices, lender’s requirements and interest rates may 
make this option unrealistic.  Thus, to argue that shared-equity housing 
imposes an inferior form of homeownership misses the point.  In most cases, it 
is the only form of homeownership reasonably available to them. 
While one might argue that government policy ought to allow subsidized 
homebuyers to keep whatever appreciation might exist, this typically is not 
what governments do.  Moreover, there are sound reasons for the policy as it 
exists.  First, there is not sufficient subsidized funding available to 
accommodate all of the low income people who would like to purchase a 
home.  Thus, those who get the opportunity to do so are often the beneficiaries 
of fortuitous circumstances.  There is typically no moral basis as to why one 
potential buyer should be chosen over any other.  To allow the windfall of 
equity appreciation to be removed from the pool of funds available to house 
the poor compounds the problem.  Initially, the subsidized buyer had no 
particular moral claim on the subsidy yet that buyer now is, at least potentially, 
allowed to increase his or her wealth with public dollars that might have been 
used to assist another low income buyer.  This converts public funds into a 
private windfall.  Secondly, an affordable unit has left the affordable stock 
forever and is unlikely to be replaced, thereby permanently reducing the 
affordable stock. 
Another shortcoming of the critique of shared equity homeownership is its 
implicit assumption that the shared equity model has been imposed on low 
 
 92. See Byrne & Diamond, supra note 82, at 534–35. 
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income buyers.  Far from being imposed, when it is available it is often sought 
by tenants as a desirable form of tenure.  If it is offered, a tenant may choose it, 
or not. Just as the tenant has a choice of whether to agree to equity limitations, 
the lender offering the subsidized financing has its own choices as to how to 
use its resources.  If the lender’s choice is to preserve the affordability of a unit 
by restricting equity, the potential buyer has the opportunity to respond as he 
or she chooses. 
In many cases, buyers choose to pursue the shared equity model of 
ownership.  Ownership of real property offers security of tenure, control over 
living environment, a stake in community, a sense of identity and, of course, a 
possibility of wealth creation.  Shared equity homeownership offers most of 
these features in a degree equal to and, in some cases, greater than any other 
form of ownership.  It is the limitation on wealth creation that motivates critics 
to label shared equity as an inferior form of ownership.  They do not examine 
the other benefits to homeowners and to the surrounding communities. 
In a comprehensive study of shared equity housing for the National 
Housing Institute, John Emmeus Davis examined several performance 
standards in order to evaluate shared equity housing.93  Davis examined the 
performance of shared equity housing in the areas of affordability, stability, 
involvement and improvement as well as wealth.94  While in some cases the 
evidence was mixed or inconclusive, he did find evidence of good performance 
in these areas, particularly when considering limited equity cooperatives.  
Other research has shown some of the indirect benefits associated with 
homeownership; better health of occupants, better achievement in school of the 
children of homeowners, and more civic involvement.95 
Even on the issue of wealth creation, Davis has found that owners of 
shared equity housing do accumulate wealth.  The question for him is not 
whether there is wealth creation but whether the amount of wealth created is 
sufficient.96  The answer depends on what is meant by sufficient.  For example, 
if the limited return is commensurate with what the open market would have 
provided,97 the question has little meaning.  If it is less than what the market 
would have provided, the question is whether the limitations on equity are at 
least balanced by other gains of the homeowner and the gains of the society.  
Similarly, if the wealth created by shared equity ownership is measured against 
 
 93. DAVIS, supra note 3, at 89–114. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See Byrne & Diamond, supra note 82, at 602. 
 96. DAVIS, supra note 3, at 103. 
 97. For example, if the market price of the unit is less than what the equity formula would 
have given the seller, the seller will have suffered no harm by virtue of the limitation.  In poor 
communities, often realizing slow or no appreciation in home prices, this would not be an 
uncommon occurrence.  See id. at 77–78. 
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the wealth created by renting, the answer weighs heavily in favor of shared 
equity ownership. 
There has also been criticism of the claim that the correct comparison is 
between shared equity homeowners and renters, not shared equity homeowners 
and other homeowners.98  The critique is that society subsidize all homeowners 
through the mortgage interest and property tax deductions but we do not ask all 
homeowners with these subsidies to share their equity. 
While this critique seems on point, I believe it is inapt.  One might argue 
generally against the breadth and depth of the mortgage interest and real estate 
tax deductions for all homeowners, particularly high bracket homeowners.  
The increased tax revenue from limiting or eliminating the subsidy might be 
used to subsidize those who truly need the assistance to become homeowners. 
For many of the recipients of the tax subsidy, it is not the deciding factor in 
whether they will buy a home.  They would do so anyway.  Moreover, if the 
subsidy were eliminated, the price of housing would likely decline so that the 
true value of the subsidy is hard to determine.  If it is true that home prices 
would decline if the subsidy were removed, and if there were more funds to 
subsidize those in need of assistance, more people might be able to afford 
houses. 
Nevertheless, there is a segment of the home buying public for whom the 
subsidy is the deciding factor in home purchases.  But even if one accepts the 
assumption that the deductions serve a generally beneficial societal purpose, it 
is not clear that society should not expect a return from these beneficiaries of 
the subsidy. 
In many cases society has extracted specific concessions from 
beneficiaries.  Consider other types of governmental subsidies for 
homeownership. The United States Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, for example, offers first-time homebuyer subsidies to certain 
classes of municipal employees such as police, fire fighters and teachers.  Both 
HUD and local jurisdictions have a desire that such employees live in the 
locales in which they work and many of these jurisdictions seek to enhance the 
possibility of fulfilling that desire by offering assistance.99  However, because 
of the government’s fear of opportunistic behavior by recipients, and its desire 
to maximize the general benefit to be derived from the subsidy, some of these 
 
 98. Critique raised at Public Nature of Private Property Workshop at Georgetown Law (Nov. 
14-15, 2008). 
 99. See Urban Homesteading, 24 C.F.R. § 590.7 (2009) (concerning the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development’s Program); see also City of Buffalo, Urban Homestead 
Program, http://www.ci.buffalo.ny.us/Home/City_Departments/RealEstate/UrbanHomestead 
Program (last visited Feb. 2, 2010) (describing Buffalo’s Urban Homestead Program); see 
generally Mother Earth News, Urban Homesteading, http://www.motherearthnews.com/Modern-
Homesteading/1980-09-01/Community-Homesteading-Programs.aspx (last visited Feb. 2, 2010). 
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jurisdictions place minimum occupancy requirements on the recipients with a 
payback of the subsidy and, perhaps some of the equity, if the recipient leaves 
the property prior to the designated time.100 
Similarly, some jurisdictions have created urban homesteading programs101 
through which they give vacant and often derelict properties to buyers for little 
or no money.  In exchange for this subsidy, the jurisdictions often require that 
buyers bring the building up to code standards within a certain period of time 
and live in the building as their primary residence for a period of time, often 
several years, or they forfeit some or all of the equity.102  To do otherwise in 
this or other subsidy programs would turn public housing funds into private 
wealth creation, a housing program into a cash transfer program.103 
2. The Concept of Property Redux 
The second reason I do not accept the argument that shared equity creates 
an inferior form of ownership brings us back to the beginning of this article.  
The meaning of property is not fixed and consistent.  It is, in Singer’s words, 
contingent and contextual.104  The bundle of sticks is rarely, if ever, complete.  
Ownership has become much more complex with many, often competing, 
interests at work in any particular piece of property.  Clearly, Blackstone’s 
view is not now, if it ever was, applicable in practice.  Society has needs that 
must be preserved and the complete dominion by one over his or her property 
is inconsistent with those needs, if for no other reason than that such dominion 
likely will interfere with another’s use and enjoyment of his or her property.105  
This is not to mention the huge area of the modern commons that needs to be 
protected against private encroachment and degradation. 
Such changing conceptions of property are not limited to land or to public 
benefits.  In another widely recognized area of property there has been a major 
conceptual variation of the classic model.  A good part of the governance 
literature concerning publicly traded corporations relates to the separation of 
ownership and management for shareholders.  The classical view is that 
shareholders own the corporation but it is clear that with very limited 
exceptions (for example, institutional or large bloc-holding individuals) 
shareholders have little or no ability to influence the policy or finances of 
 
 100. See sources cited in supra note 99. 
 101. See sources cited in supra note 99. 
 102. Habitat for Humanity in the District of Columbia requires a buyer to share the equity 
based on a formula if the property is sold within fifteen years.  See Byrne & Diamond, supra note 
82, at 546. 
 103. Id. at 549. 
 104. Singer, supra note 5, at 4. 
 105. Thus, the law of nuisance protects against substantial and unreasonable interference with 
a landowner’s use and enjoyment of his or her property.  See, e.g., Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 
77 S.E.2d 682, 689 (N.C. 1953). 
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publicly traded corporations.  Even in the aggregate, typical shareholders do 
not, and, in a practical sense, cannot have such influence.  This is because such 
shareholders have no economic incentive to monitor the corporation’s 
activities, to organize other shareholders to take action against perceived 
wrongdoing or bad policy, or even to attend shareholder meetings.  In fact, the 
existence of a ready market for the sale of their shares provides a rational 
alternative for such shareholders to express their dissatisfaction. 
The shareholders, similarly to most homeowners, have lost one or more of 
the major sticks in their ownership bundle.  They were offered a different 
benefit, the protection of limited liability, in exchange for their loss of control.  
In each case, there was some overriding social good to be achieved by the 
limitations imposed.  This is consistent with both the proprietary view of 
property taken by writers from colonial times to the present and with the 
contingent and contextual nature of property as seen across cultures and across 
time. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts 
are normally matters of private and not public concern.  The general rule is that 
both shall be free from public interference.  But neither property rights nor 
contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at 
will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of 
contract to work them harm.  Equally fundamental with the private right is that 
of the public to regulate it in the public interest.106 
Today, such regulatory mainstays as the Fair Housing and Public 
Accommodation laws, environmental protections such as the Clean Air and 
Clean Water Acts, zoning laws, housing and building codes, and rent controls 
have reduced the Blackstonian and Lockean views of property to the academic 
dust bin.  Instead of despotic dominion, the regulatory regime has redefined 
property in Gregory Alexander’s proprietarian model.  What had once been the 
tension between individual rights and communal rights has been resolved, if 
not completely, at least substantially, in the direction of protecting the broader 
society.  The interdependence of people, of localities, even of nations, demands 
that dominion be tempered and the common good be pursued. 
 The common good can be perceived as preserving affordable housing 
for the long term.  The private market cannot or will not meet the societal need 
for such housing.  Sharing equity is one attempt by the public to meet that 
need.  Society has an interest in the retention of the subsidy it provides to the 
affordable housing market.  The recipient of the subsidy has an interest in the 
general benefits of homeownership.  The limitation on equity retention by the 
 
 106. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 523 (1934). 
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homeowner is a means of accommodating both sets of preferences.  Moreover, 
it is entirely consistent with the restrictions placed on all forms of property to 
meet societal concerns. A classicist might then argue that property as 
envisaged today has regressed from Locke and Blackstone’s conception 
(although this would disregard the rich history of differing views of property) 
but it is much more difficult to single out shared equity housing as a significant 
departure from the conceptual and regulatory trend of modern society. 
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